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Abstract—Computer networks security is a hard issue, 
which continuously evolves due to the change of technolo-
gies, architectures and algorithms and the growing complex-
ity of architectures and systems. This question is enforced in 
distributed contexts where the lack of a central authority 
imposes to set up a proper strategy for both passive and 
active security. Moreover, it is also essential to test the strat-
egy under as many attack scenarios as possible, to discover 
and tackle unforeseen situations; this cannot be easily per-
formed on the real system without avoiding either security 
risks (when it is running) or high costs (if the system must 
be disconnected from the network during tests). A viable 
solution is represented by the use of virtualization technolo-
gies. Leveraging virtualization permits us to set up an effec-
tive and efficient real network duplicate, which can be used 
for the assessment of security in a non-trivial, risk-free and 
costs saving fashion. 
Index Terms—Virtualization, IT Security, Distributed sys-
tems 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The security of computer networks is a hard issue con-
tinuously evolving over time, due to the change of tech-
nologies, architectures and algorithms and the complexity 
of applications and systems that are growing faster and 
faster. In particular, in the last decades there has been a 
growing interest in data protection and security for both 
users and organizations, while at the same time new sce-
narios arose, from that of generic distributed systems, to 
the more specific and somehow fascinating terms as grids 
[11], cloud computing [7], pervasive and ubiquitous com-
puting [3][21][34]. Moreover, distributed applications 
running in these contexts make frequent use of agents or 
mobile agents systems, making the question of security 
harder and harder. Indeed, mobile agent systems [16] are a 
special type of software agents that are able to migrate to 
other hosts, i.e., they transfer their code and context to 
another host where the execution will continue; due to this 
nature, companies and users are generally skeptical in 
allowing uncontrolled code execution, being essentially 
the same mechanism used by viruses, malware and other 
malicious codes; this is also one of the main reasons for 
which the number of commercial applications based on 
mobile agents is still rather small, despite their potentiali-
ties and gained interest [6]. 
In such a scenario, several security related issues must 
be considered [12] as cryptography, access control and 
trust management, intrusion detection, tamper resistance, 
authentication, privacy and many others [10]. Over the 
years, a set of procedures, best practices and technologies 
have been developed to address these issues, in order to 
protect the resources, people and organizations working in 
the network. Moreover economic and legal matters related 
to assessing and managing security has been deeply stud-
ied. 
Security techniques have been classified in passive, 
based on the use of IDS, and active, based on the man-
agement of permissions. In most cases, any approach to 
the security requires to perform a series of tests on the real 
system to discover and tackle unforeseen situations, thus 
assessing and validating the endorsed policy. However, 
performing such tests on a real system however is not a 
trivial matter, since when it is running and provides access 
and services to the outside world, the execution of tests 
could interfere with normal activities even exposing the 
system to security threats, since tests often imply moni-
tored attack attempts that could be disruptive. On the other 
hand, the schedule of an offline time period during which 
tests are performed safely is not advisable due to the high 
costs of services interruptions, especially for commercial 
companies. 
A viable solution is represented by the use of virtualiza-
tion technologies [19][28], which aim at improving the 
utilization of computing resources through their abstrac-
tion and re-arrangement; this is accomplished via hard-
ware and software partitioning or aggregation, partial or 
complete machine simulation, emulation and other meth-
odologies. The concept of virtualization can be applied at 
different levels, ranging from hardware, operating system, 
libraries, applications to, more recently, networks and 
organizations [9][23]. 
The adoption of virtualization leads to a set of ad-
vantages, in addition to the optimized use of computing 
resources, as the reduction of configuration workload and 
administrative costs [35], the improvement in application 
porting [24] and systems survivability [32] the energy 
saving and the possibility of creating artificial environ-
ments for different purposes, as for instance in [14].  
In this paper we focus on the last aspect, specifically we 
propose a tool named VirtualNet that allows to set up a 
virtual network, tailored to perform security assessment 
on such a duplicate of the real network. The evolution of 
virtual environments indeed guarantees to hold down the 
amount of both hardware and software resources needed 
for virtual environment management and, at the same 
time, to faithfully reproduce the behavior of real systems. 
Our proposal exploits Xen [2] and Qemu [5] virtualization 
software to instantiate a large number of virtual hosts that 
can be configured with identical settings (OS, services 
etc.) of real counterparts (often already deployed and real 
offering services to user); moreover, network interfaces of 
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such hosts can be easily connected to create several virtual 
networks, allowing us to compose and examine different 
network configurations. 
In summary, leveraging virtualization permits us to set 
up an effective and efficient duplicate of the real network 
where the assessment of security can be conducted assur-
ing both its effectiveness, since tests conducted on a virtu-
al network can be identical to those performed in real 
environments, also in a risk-free fashion, as any (eventual-
ly destructive) attack actually does not impact on the real 
network, finally with a significant costs saving, since the 
real network is not involved in tests. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides 
an overview about security issues and which tools are 
used to address such issues. Section III introduces virtual-
ization techniques and tools, whereas in Section IV we 
present VirtualNet, the tool for network security assess-
ment proposed in this paper, showing some attacks scenar-
ios in Section V. Finally, in Section VI we present our 
conclusions and future works. 
II. IT SECURITY 
In IT context, the security is a milestone to preserve any 
computer network from undesirable malfunctioning and 
services interruptions [15][29]. Nowadays, security is of 
critical importance since devices and applications interact 
each others in an “always connected” distributed world of 
applications and services 
The term security refers to several tools and policies 
aiming at guaranteeing goals as confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, accountability and others. It can be classified 
according to different criteria; a first distinction is made 
between physical and logical security, being the former an 
old but still crucial aspect often underestimated (a classi-
cal example is the personal password written on a post-it 
stuck on the office’s PC monitor), whereas logical security 
is sometimes less tangible but it plays a key role in IT. A 
second classification leads to passive and active security, 
in the following briefly discussed together with the corre-
sponding most adopted software solutions. 
The passive security aims at detecting unusual events or 
behaviors that might represent an attack; to this purpose, a 
widely adopted approach is that of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), i.e. a combination of hardware and soft-
ware tools used to reveal unauthorized access (or attempt 
to access). IDS can be rule-based, when a set of prede-
fined behaviors have been modeled and are used by the 
IDS to alert whenever one of such rule is matched, or it 
can be adaptive, being in this case able to detect unfore-
seen but potentially suspected behaviors. The latter type is 
better, but it costs more and can run into more false posi-
tives. The system monitored by IDS is usually a whole 
network, where attacks can be issued from different hosts 
and directed towards many others, concerning an intranet 
and/or the Internet. The de facto standard Network IDS 
(NIDS) is the Snort open source software [25], which 
performs real-time traffic and protocol analysis and packet 
logging on IP networks; it can be used to detect a variety 
of attacks and probes through traffic content searching and 
matching (it indeed comes with a huge database of rules) 
[26]. In our proposal, Snort has been used as NIDS to 
detect attacks in virtualization-based scenario representing 
real environments (see section IV). The active security 
concerns with tools and techniques intended to prevent 
attacks, usually by blocking specific traffic patterns. The 
role of active security is complementary to that of passive, 
being the former used for prevention and the latter for 
detection of every malicious behavior that was not recog-
nized (hence not blocked) by active security tools. The 
main term used in active security is the firewall, a hard-
ware/software solution that allows or denies network traf-
fic based on its content or according to specific pat-
terns/policies. The firewall generally is used to protect a 
network from another, e.g. an intranet from the Internet, 
and it can work in different modes: 
packet level, where the packet content is used to for-
ward or discard it, not paying attention to whether that 
packet is part of an existing stream; 
application level, in which the firewall it can understand 
certain applications and protocols (as FTP, DNS, or web 
browsing), and it can detect if a protocol is being abused; 
stateful packet inspection, i.e. the firewall tracks all 
connections passing through it and is able to determine 
whether a packet is the start of a new connection, a part of 
an existing one, or is invalid, therefore detecting anoma-
lies within packet streams. 
A firewall can be implemented as a software or even 
hardware solution; in this work, the virtualization natural-
ly leads to software firewalls, in particular we chose the 
Iptables classical stateful Linux firewall working with 
Netfilter, the packet filtering framework inside the Linux 
2.4.x and 2.6.x kernel series [20]. In addition, since we 
exploit virtualization provided by XEN for Linux virtual 
hosts and Qemu for Windows and FreeBSD virtual hosts 
(see section IV), we also considered the pfSense open 
source firewall distribution for FreeBSD [4]. 
Finally, in addition to IDS and firewall, another tool is 
Nmap [18], an open source port scanner that detects which 
ports are opened, closed or blocked at a given host. Nmap 
was used during our security assessment to simulate an 
attacker that first explores the network to discover unpro-
tected hosts (i.e. with some port opened) to be further used 
as victims. Nmap is also capable of detecting which ser-
vices are active on opened ports, which application is 
offering that service, its version and other details; it also 
can recognize the OS running on the scanned host by 
exploiting its OSes fingerprint database, therefore Nmap 
can be effectively used in security assessment as a power-
ful tool. 
However, the architecture of VirtualNet allows us to in-
tegrate any filter or security devices based on supported 
operating system or simulated by those systems. 
III. VIRTUALIZATION TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
The first idea of a virtual machine is dated at 1960s, 
when it was introduced to denote a running instance of a 
physical machine [28]. This was to give the illusion of 
having a total, direct and exclusive access to that physical 
machine, actually concealing the need of time- and re-
source- sharing users had to accept to leverage first expen-
sive mainframe capabilities. With the decreasing of hard-
ware costs and the advent of multiprocessing operating 
systems, the need for virtualization was drastically re-
duced during 1970s and 1980s, resuming its importance in 
the 1990s with the plethora of PC based hardware and 
operating systems. Further, virtualization has been adopt-
ed in more and more disparate contexts, in conjunction 
with the shifting from centralized to distributed systems, 
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finally leading to the newest scenarios of virtual storage, 
virtual networks and virtual organizations. 
The adoption of virtualization provides several ad-
vantages [24][32][35], one of the most relevant is the 
optimization in using computing resources, accomplished 
at different levels, from the multicore CPUs, where manu-
facturers started to provide native support e.g. with the 
Virtualization Technology from IntelTM or the Secure 
Virtual Machine from AMDTM, to OS, libraries and appli-
cations.  A consequence of optimized use of resources is 
the costs saving, since virtualization can be effectively 
used to reduce the hardware acquisition cost, at the same 
time improving the productivity as many users with dif-
ferent requirements can work simultaneously on the same 
hardware.  
The main three virtualization techniques to allow a ge-
neric guest OS to run onto a host system can be summa-
rized as follows: 
Emulation, where a complete hardware architecture is 
replicated via software, thus a guest OS runs on a fully 
compatible virtual hardware layer. This approach provides 
great flexibility but with a significant performance over-
head. 
Native Virtualization, where a software known as vir-
tual machine monitor or hypervisor translates the com-
mands of the guest OS to the host hardware 
Paravirtualization, where the guest OS is (partially) 
modified to allow direct communication with the hypervi-
sor. 
This approach requires the presence of proper drivers to 
achieve guest OS and hypervisor compatibility and conse-
quently the guest OS is aware about the existence of the 
virtual environment it is running on, whereas emulation 
and native virtualization do not; conversely, performances 
are the best available. 
Other specific approaches to virtualization exist, as the 
Operating System Level Virtualization, where an OS ker-
nel provides for multiple isolated user-space instances 
(used for a software to run in isolation from others), the 
Resource Virtualization, in which a given resource of the 
host system is used by the guest OS (this is the approach 
adopted in building clusters), and Application Virtualiza-
tion, in which a single application virtual machine allows 
emulation of a specific environment (for instance, the 
JavaTM virtual machine). In [19], a more detailed descrip-
tion and comparison of several techniques for virtualiza-
tion can be found.  
To implement virtualization, a set of software tools is 
available, each one based on previously described tech-
niques and coming with its pros and cons. Some of them 
are XEN [2], Qemu [5], VMware [30], VirtualBox [27] 
and many others. Here we focus on XEN and Qemu that 
are both open sources, in particular XEN is a para-
virtualization based software that provides great perfor-
mances, whereas Qemu works in emulator or native virtu-
alization fashion and offers a large hardware support. 
Note that it is outside the scope of our work to compare 
virtualization tools; several papers are present in literature 
to address this issue, e.g. [1]. Our goal is to exploit virtual-
ization in the VirtualNet tool for security assessments, 
where virtual hosts are set up to duplicate real environ-
ments; to this purpose, in the following we outline how 
networking is managed by XEN. 
 
Figure 1.  An example of how networking operates with XEN 
A XEN framework consists of a first virtual machine, 
known as dom0 or privileged domain, and a set of unprivi-
leged machines named domU, U=1,...,N; all domU virtual 
machines (each with its own OS, applications etc.) com-
municate with dom0 to gain access to real hardware re-
sources, being the dom0 responsible for hardware and 
virtual resource management as well as for the creation, 
suspend, resume, and destroy of domU virtual machines. 
Each time a new virtual machine is instantiated, it can 
have different (virtual) network interfaces, all of them 
associated to a corresponding set of virtual network inter-
faces in the dom0 thanks to a bridging mechanism, which 
ensures isolation of the network traffic in distinct virtual 
interfaces. 
The association with dom0 virtual interfaces is needed 
since physical networking is only managed by dom0; 
XEN in particular makes the physical device accessible 
via a software-based switch, whose (virtual) ports are 
dom0 virtual interfaces. An example to illustrate this 
mechanism is shown in Figure 1.  
In this example, the physical network card managed by 
dom0 is peth0; this is accessible via the xenbr0 bridge,  
the software-based switch whose virtual ports are vif1.0, 
connected to the virtual interface eth0 on dom1, and 
vif2.0, vif2.1, that are respectively the interfaces eth0 and 
eth1 of the virtual machine dom2. This approach allows 
any network configuration, as any domU can have its own 
number of interfaces; moreover the implementation is 
faithfully thanks to the traffic isolation guaranteed by 
xenbr0 for all virtual network interfaces. The simple and 
powerful configuration we described is leveraged to allow 
the creation of virtual environments, as discussed in the 
next section. 
IV. THE VIRTUALNET TOOL 
In this section we present VirtualNet a tool for virtual-
ization-based network security assessment. In particular, 
as introduced previously, we leverage XEN and Qemu to 
instantiate and configure virtual hosts as well as to con-
nect their interfaces to set up a duplicate of a real scenario, 
so that security test can be conducted in a faithfully, costs 
saving and risk-free fashion. 
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Figure 2.  A Snapshot of VirtualNet 
Other works based on virtualization exists, e.g. in [33] 
VMware is used to set up a virtual laboratory for network 
security; our proposal differs in the use of open source 
softwares (XEN and Qemu) and in the fact that our pur-
pose is not to create a safe and secure environment (as it is 
deliverable for students in a virtual laboratory), rather 
VirtualNet  can be used also to test disruptive scenarios, 
e.g. where DoS or penetration exploits attacks to server 
machines can be conducted to effectively test the dupli-
cate of real environment. 
A network consists of several elements, i.e. a set of 
hosts connected together, each one coming with a set of 
installed applications and services, and an infrastructure 
network they are connected to; such network can include 
devices as firewall, switch, routers and so on. In our ap-
proach is possible to create as many hosts as needed, each 
one with several virtual network interfaces, in order to 
connect them to any number of networks. Note that Virtu-
alNet does not impose specific network topologies, how-
ever it allows us to insert virtual network devices (e.g. 
routers, dhcp servers) as needed; other works exploit vir-
tualization just for such devices, e.g. [17] focuses on the 
development of a XEN-based firewall with netfil-
ter/iptables software. Finally, note that VirtualNet allows 
us the creation of networks where virtual hosts are con-
nected each other, in the sense that virtualization is used 
for hosts creation and configuration rather than for deploy-
ing a virtual network infrastructure. Other works (e.g., [8], 
[9], [31], [36]) focus on virtual networks, for instance how 
specific traffic patterns can be generated and are transmit-
ted over the network, how virtual networks are mapped 
onto physical ones (overlay networks) and so on; here we 
do not address such issues. 
VirtualNet has been written in Python language and it 
uses an XML-based format to save and load created sce-
narios. It also provides a simple and intuitive GUI through 
which all actions can be performed. 
A snapshot of VirtualNet is given in Figure 2, where a 
scenario with a couple of hosts, some networks, a router 
and some probes to scan the networks is shown. To create 
hosts, the PC-like icon on the top of the floating toolbar of 
Figure 2 is used. Once the host is given a name, a corre-
sponding icon will represent it; by right-clicking on that 
icon several options are available, in particular: 
• the host network interface can be configured by 
providing standard TCP/IP parameters as IP address, 
netmask, gateway etc. ; 
• the type of host is established; in particular the Qemu 
has been used in addition to XEN since it allows dif-
ferent OSes than classical Linux flavors (as for in-
stance, Windows). This way up to four host virtual-
ization types can be selected, i.e. XEN paravirtualiza-
tion, XEN full virtualization, Qemu-based Windows 
or FreeBSD; 
• the host can be started (i.e. virtual machine will be 
instantiated and run) and its services can be config-
ured.
 
To define hosts services, the ServicePool item in the 
menu is used (Figure 3). 
As shown in Figure, the new service is given a name 
(service1 in figure), and the actual type of service can be 
selected from a list; basic network services are available 
from the list, in particular: 
• the DNS, using the Bind9 software; 
• Firewalling (via iptables or pfsense); 
• WWW service, using the Apache web server; 
• Mail server, using the Postfix open source mailer; 
• Routing, that allows TCP/IP packets forwarding; 
• DCHP service, via the dhcpd server daemon; 
• Switch, that allows the host to act as a network 
switch. 
The GUI also provides all standard configurations for 
listed services. 
 
Figure 3.  The creation of a service 
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In addition to hosts, which are the main elements, other 
components can be created using the toolbar in Figure 2, 
in particular the cloud-shaped icon allows to create a net-
work which is given an identifier and a range of addresses 
in the form of 32-bit mask. A particular network can be 
created with the Inet icon on the toolbar; it represents the 
xenbr0 switch on dom0, i.e. the physical network con-
nected to the outside world. 
The last elements VirtualNet allows us to add concern 
the network security, indeed they are the probes (denoted 
with the’P’ icon in the toolbar shown in Figure 2) and the 
sniffers, instantiable via the ’Snif’ icon. 
The probe is a host that comes with a port scanner and 
with an intrusion detection system (in our case we chose 
respectively Nmap and Snort), whose combination make 
probe the right object for network monitoring. The probe 
can be configured as desired, being a XEN-based virtual 
machine like any other host, in particular it is provided 
with the IP address of the target machine; i.e. the host 
acting placed in a strategic position in the virtual network 
in order to effectively analyze the network.  
The sniffer is a host that exploits WireShark [22] to 
sniff packets and logs the traffic into a file for further 
analysis; similarly as for the probe, the sniffer must be 
provided with the IP address of the host to monitor. All 
hosts, included the special hosts probe and sniffer, will be 
connected together through networks, which are used as 
interconnecting elements. 
VirtualNet allows to save a virtual scenario in a XML-
based format to provide human-readability and ease of 
information exchanging; an example is given in Figure 4.  
After the scenario has been created with the desired 
number and type of hosts and networks, in order to repro-
duce a real environment, the assessment of security should 
be performed. This can be accomplished manually by 
connecting to probe and/or sniffer objects; however Vir-
tualNet also offers the possibility that a probe performs a 
network validation. In particular, right–clicking on a pre-
viously created probe a menu appears (see Figure 5), 
where a given host (or a whole network) can be specified 
as a target, together with a range of ports. 
Then, a test can be selected from a list, e.g. the TCP 
SynPing, the TCP Ack Ping or others (a brief description 
is given in the menu); in addition, the probe can be set to 
discover both the OS and the services available at target 
hosts. When the probe will be started, it will execute the 
selected test and produce an output XML file; such results 
can also be shown on the GUI or saved for further pro-
cessing.  
Finally, VirtualNet can also perform all tests in an au-
tomatic fashion, in particular first via a host discovery 
then executing tests listed in Figure 5 sequentially, pro-
ducing an XML file for each test. This mode can be used 
as a first network validation; if the security of the virtual 
environment is not acceptable, more specific, manual tests 
can be further executed. 
V. ATTACK SCENARIOS 
After having introduced VirtualNet, here we illustrate 
some realistic scenarios where security assessment is 
performed. In particular, we conducted a penetration test, 
seeking for services and hosts vulnerabilities in the scenar-
io of Figure 6. 
 
Figure 4.  An example of XML-based file managed by VirtualNet  
 
Figure 5.  A probe network validation menu 
In this environment, two networks are present, i.e. net0 
with IP range 10.10.10.0/24 and net1 with IP range
10.10.0.0/24; the traffic between them is forwarded via the 
Router indicated in the figure, and whose IP addresses on 
both networks are respectively the 10.10.10.1 and the 
10.10.0.1. In the 10.10.0.0/24 network, we also placed two 
hosts, the Host 0 with IP the 10.10.0.3 and Host 1 with IP 
the 10.10.0.2. 
This scenario models the frequent situation in which 
some hosts are connected to an intranet (here, the 
10.10.0.0/24) to be protected from external attacks, and a 
router acts as a firewall to properly filter the traffic com-
ing from the outside (here, the 10.10.10.0/24 network); to 
this purpose, the Router was a XEN powered virtual ma-
chine with a Debian Linux, with enabled packet forward-
ing and netfilter/iptables as a firewall software. 
To complete the scenario, three probes have been creat-
ed, the Snort 1 with IP 10.10.10.8 used to analyze the 
traffic over the 10.10.10.0/24 network, the Nmap with IP 
10.10.10.4, used to perform attacks to the victim host Host 
1, and the Snort 2 with IP 10.10.0.8 used to analyze the 
traffic over the 10.10.0.0/24 network, in particular to de-
tect the attacks from Nmap. The dashed lines connecting 
Nmap and Snort 2 with Host 1 denotes fact that Host 1 is 
the victim. Finally, they interface to the 192.168.2.0/24 
network, which is a control network (being not part of the 
scenario) used to provide SSH access to all probes for 
management purposes, i.e. to launch the penetration test.  
Test was started by selecting the automatic Network 
validation for the Nmap probe, as introduced previously 
(see Figure 8, where the target IP was set to 10.10.0.2). 
<?xml version=1.0"?> 
<structure> 
    <Host id = "Host0"> 
 <iface id = "eth0"> 
    <ip>192.168.2.1></ip> 
    <netmask> 255.255.255.0 </netmask> 
    <gateway> 192.168.2.1 </gateway> 
    <broadcast> 192.168.2.2 </broadcast> 
   <inet>net0</inet> 
 </iface> 
 <type id="Linux"/> 
    </Host> 
<network addr="192.168.3.10/24" 
     id="netext" linktoexternal="yes"/> 
    <network addr="192.168.3.0/24"  
     id="netext" linktoexternal="no"/> 
</structure> 
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Figure 6.  The first scenario used for security assessment test 
During the first test, the firewall did not block any traf-
fic, i.e. net1 was not protected; after the test has been 
performed, the output provided by Snort 2 is shown in 
Figure 7, where the probe revealed successful attacks 
coming from Nmap (ALERTS:3 in figure). 
In a second test, firewall rules were enforced to protect
the net1, including the target Host 1; this time, the same 
attack coming from Nmap was blocked, indeed the probe 
Snort 1 detect the attacks since they come from the same 
network of Nmap, i.e. net0, but Snort 2 does not report 
any suspect traffic, thanks to the protection provided by 
the firewall at the Router (outputs are not shown). Similar 
test were conducted replacing the Router with a virtual 
machine powered by Qemu with FreeBSD as OS and 
pfSense as firewall, getting similar results, i.e. successful 
attacks when pfsense does not filter any traffic and an 
acceptable protection for Host 1 when the firewall is 
properly configured. 
A second scenario for security assessment is represent-
ed in Figure 8, where net1 represents a Militarized Zone 
(MZ), i.e. an internal network to protect that includes Host 
1  and  the monitor probe Snort1. The network net2 repre- 
 
Figure 7.  Snort ouput in the first security assessment scenario 
represents a DeMilitarized Zone (DMZ), i.e. a network 
where vulnerable services (e.g., www) will be placed; 
inside this network, Host 2 is the victim of attacks, moni-
tored by the probe Snort2.  The  network  net0  represents  
the outsideworld (i.e. the internet), where attacks come 
from; in particular the attacker is the probe Nmap. The 
Router connects the networks and also acts as a firewall 
(pfSense). Finally, the network ext is used to manage all 
probes via SSH (as for the first scenario). 
In a first experiment, Nmap was used to attack both the 
MZ and the DMZ, with the firewall disabled; the output of 
Nmap is shown in Figure 9, where the attacker discovered 
both hosts, i.e. Host 1 on net1 and Host 2 on net2. 
Further, the firewall was properly configured to filter 
attacks, in particular the traffic coming from net0 is 
blocked (deny policy) when directed to the MZ network, 
and allowed if directed to the DMZ network, whereas 
DMZ and MZ can communicate each other, as normally 
occurs in a real scenario. Starting the test with the probe 
Nmap, this time Snort 2 detects attacks coming from the 
outside and directed to the DMZ (29 alerts in Figure 9), 
whereas the Snort 1 does not reveal any attack, showing 
that MZ is effectively protected by the firewall.  
In real environments, traffic to the DMZ is generally 
not totally allowed, rather proper filtering policy are estab-
lished at the firewall, so that only non-malicious traffic is 
allowed; here we just aimed at performing some tests to 
validate VirtualNet in security assessment. The tool has 
been revealed useful since all tests were performed in a 
risk-free fashion, i.e. the victim of attacks were virtual 
hosts rather than real servers, so any experiment can be 
conducted safely, yet preserving its accuracy in reproduc-
ing real conditions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work the question of network security has been 
considered, introducing the VirtualNet tool that exploits 
virtualization to set up a virtual environments (virtual 
hosts and networks), where security assessment can be 
safely and faithfully performed on duplicate of real sce-
narios. We presented VirtualNet and its capabilities, also 
conducting penetration tests in two real scenarios, show-
ing the usefulness of our proposal.  
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Figure 8.  The second scenario used for security assessment test 
VII. FUTURE WORKS 
This work deserves some considerations about future 
ideas, in particular: 
first, security assessment in more complex scenarios 
should be performed, in order to completely validate Vir-
tualNet; several attacks could be tested, as for instance 
DNS poisoning, SymLink attacks, SYN flooding, smurf 
attacks, DoS, DDos and others; 
the virtual network creates VirtualNet does not take in-
to account bandwidth, QoS and other features; to allow 
experiments in different network conditions, this issue 
should be addressed (as for instance in [8]) ; 
VirtualNet performs security tests automatically but the 
position of probes is manually selected; a further evolu-
tion of the tool concerns semi-automatic functionality that 
helps to discover where attacks can come from, and which 
countermeasures could be adopted (e.g. how firewall 
should be configured). 
 
Figure 9.  Snort results for DMZ in the second scenario 
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